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Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered 
the World? 
 
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN 
 
By the 1700s Europeans dominated the gunpowder technology, which was 
surprising, because it had originated in China and been used with expertise 
throughout Eurasia. To account for their dominance, historians have  
invoked competition, but it cannot explain why they pushed this technology 
further than anyone else. The answer lies with a simple tournament model of  
military competition that allows for learning by doing. Political incentives and 
military conditions then explain why the rest of Eurasia fell behind Europeans  
in developing the gunpowder technology. The consequences were huge, from 
colonialism to the slave trade and even the Industrial Revolution. 
 
n the “great divergence” debate over when and why Europe forged 
ahead of the rest of Eurasia, one topic has been overlooked—namely, 
violence, or at least violence with gunpowder weapons. Here Europe 
possessed an undeniable comparative and absolute advantage, early  
on: European states were simply better at making and using artillery, 
firearms, fortifications, and armed ships than powers in other parts of 
the world and they had this advantage long before 1800. They used this 
gunpowder technology to wage war at home and to establish outposts 
abroad. The result was that by 1800 Europeans had conquered some  
35 percent of the globe and were preying upon lucrative trade routes  
as far away as Asia. They took control of even more territory in the 
nineteenth century.1 Other forces certainly worked in their favor as well, 
including the diseases that they introduced into vulnerable populations, 
and there were limits to what firearms could do.2 Nonetheless, the 
gunpowder technology clearly played a large role in European conquest. 
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Why then was it the Europeans who came to dominate the technology, 
and not the Japanese, the Ottomans, or the Indians, who all used it with 
expertise? Or why wasn’t it the Chinese, who had invented it? 
 This question has attracted a number of gifted military historians, but 
the closest they come to a deeper explanation is the claim that military 
competition in Europe gave the Europeans an edge. The argument has 
been formulated most cogently by Paul Kennedy, who points to Europe’s 
competitive markets and persistent military rivalries. In his view, while 
military rivalry created an arms race, competitive markets fostered 
military innovation and kept one country from establishing an empire.3 
 But Kennedy’s story of competition is not the final answer, for it 
leaves far too much unexplained. To begin, competitive markets do  
not always stimulate innovation. The clearest example comes from 
agriculture in early modern Europe, which had highly competitive 
markets but witnessed virtually no productivity growth.4 
 Nor do ongoing military rivalries always promote innovation. They 
failed to do so in eighteenth-century India and Southeast Asia. The case 
of India, as we shall see, is particularly illuminating. Like Europe, it had 
markets and incessant warfare, and the combatants were quick to adopt 
the latest weapons and tactics. The innovations, however, by and large 
originated in the West. 
 The answer lies with the peculiar form of competition in which 
European rulers were engaged. It was a winner-take-all tournament  
that spurred rulers to spend enormous sums on using the gunpowder 
technology in the continent’s incessant wars. In the process, the 
technology was advanced via learning by doing. Elsewhere, however, 
political and military conditions were not conducive to improving the 
gunpowder technology. That is why the Europeans pushed the technology 
further than anyone else and why the rest of the world had trouble 
catching up. 
 Understanding why requires a look at the political, military, and  
fiscal incentives rulers faced, both in Europe and in other parts of 
Eurasia. We will start with Europe before 1800 and use it to motivate  
a simple tournament model, which will then be applied to the rest  
of the world. The model’s predictions are borne out by quantitative  
and qualitative evidence; other explanations—including the argument 
about competition—fail such a test. The model thus gives us a deeper 
understanding of why Europeans came to dominate a technology that 
made world conquest possible. 
 
3 Kennedy, Rise, pp. 1624. 
4 Hoffman, Growth. 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF WAR IN EUROPE 
Period 
Average Percentage of Time Principal  
European Powers Were at War 
15501600 71 
16001650 66 
16501700 54 
17001750 43 
17501800 29 
18001850 36 
18501900 23 
Note: The principal European powers are defined as France, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, 
Prussia, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, and Poland. 
Source: Wright, Study, p. 1, tables 29, 45, 46; Levy, War, leads to similar results. 
 
RULERS AND THEIR INCENTIVES IN EUROPE BEFORE 1800 
 
 The states that coalesced in Europe in the waning days of the Middle 
Ages by and large had a single purpose, at least if we judge by the 
reasons why they levied taxes and borrowed money. That purpose  
was clearly warfare. In the major powers, some 40 to 80 percent of the 
budget went directly to the military, to defray the costs of armies and 
navies that fought almost without interruption (Table 1). The fraction  
of the budget devoted to war climbed even higher—to 95 percent in 
France during the Thirty Years War—if we add sums spent subsidizing 
allies or paying of the debts of past wars.5 
 In early modern Europe, decisions about war typically lay in  
the hands of a ruler such as a king or a prince. He would of course  
be advised by councilors and influenced by elites, and an influential 
minister might sometimes be dictating most of the decisions. But the 
assumption that a king or prince made the decisions about war is not  
far from historical reality. Even in eighteenth-century Britain, where 
Parliament and the cabinet decided whether to commence hostilities, the 
choices about the conduct of the war once it had begun were ultimately 
up to the king.6 
 What then made European kings take up arms? That question has  
to be answered if we are to understand what the tournament was. In 
Europe’s major powers, the rulers often won control of warfare in the 
process of assembling their states in the late Middle Ages or the 
sixteenth century. In modern terms, they provided the public good of 
defense in return for taxes. That public good was precious, as anyone 
 
5 Hoffman and Rosenthal, “Political Economy”; and Tilly, Coercion.  
6 Harding, Amphibious, pp. 2830; Lynn, “International”; Rodger, Command, p. 242; Mallett 
Mercenaries, p. 88; and Pettegree, “Elizabethan.” 
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who suffered through the horrors of the One Hundred Years War in 
France or the Thirty Years War in central Europe could testify. But the 
rulers of early modern Europe likely provided far more defense than 
their average subject would have wanted. They went on the offensive 
too, and not just to protect their kingdoms. 
 The reasons were not hard to understand. The kings and princes  
had been raised to fight one another, with toy soldiers, pikes, and 
firearms as children and actual training in their youth. Advisers like 
Machiavelli might tell them that princes “ought to have no object, 
thought, or profession but war.” Their own fathers would teach them 
that war was a path to glory, a means to “distinguish [kings] . . . and  
to fulfill the great expectations . . . inspired in the public,” in the words 
of Louis XIV’s instructions for his son. For them, fighting had gone 
beyond the needs of defense and become, in the words of Galileo, a 
“royal sport.”7 
 Glory did recede as a motive for war in the eighteenth century, when 
the major powers might fight simply to preserve their reputation, to gain 
commercial advantage, or to snatch territory from weaker neighbors. 
But war was still “what . . . rulers did.” It continued to appeal to them, 
just as it long had attracted much of the European aristocracy.8 
 For the major monarchs of early modern Europe, victory was thus a 
source of glory or a way to enhance their reputation. Grabbing territory 
from small neighbors did augment their resources and help strategically, 
but the thirst for glory and the drive to bolster their standing could  
push them to spend large sums even on small bits of terrain. Their goals 
may seem bizarre, but there are certainly modern analogues—the race 
to get a man on the moon, or, to take a nongovernmental example, 
college athletics. And although the kings might lose small amounts 
territory themselves, they faced no major downside risk to their thrones, 
at least in the larger states, for loss in battle in anything but a civil war 
never toppled a major monarch from his throne, at least in the years 
15001790.9 
 It now becomes clearer why the early modern rulers fought so much. 
What impels states to engage in hostilities is something of a mystery,  
at least to many economists and political scientists, who rightly ask why 
leaders do not simply agree to give the likely victor what he would  
win in a war and then spare themselves the lives and resources wasted 
in battle. The literature offers several reasons why such agreements 
prove unattainable, and why leaders go to war instead, despite all the 
 
7 Sonnino, Louis XIV, p. 124; Machiavelli, Prince, p. 247; Hale, War and Society, pp. 2932. 
8 Lynn, “International”; and Bell, Total War, pp. 2935. 
9 Hoffman, “Politics and Economics,” Table 2. Losses in war did cost ministers their position. 
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devastation it causes.10 Although all of these reasons apply to early 
modern Europe, two of them seem to fit the continent’s history like a 
glove. 
 The first was that the leaders making decisions about war—early 
modern Europe’s kings and princes—stood to win a disproportionate 
share of the spoils from victory but avoided a full share of the costs. 
They—not their subjects—were the ones who basked in glory or who 
burnished their military reputations when their armies were victorious. 
But they bore few of the costs, which fell disproportionately on  
their subjects. When the leaders’ incentives are that biased, it can be 
impossible to reach any sort of bargain to avoid war, even if the leaders 
trade resources to compensate one another.11 
 There was a second obstacle to peaceful agreement as well—the 
difficulty of dividing the spoils of war that the early modern princes  
and kings were fighting over. Glory could not be divvied up. In  
fact, it simply vanished if there was no fighting, making the peaceful 
exchange of resources potentially more expensive than fighting. The 
same held for reputation; it too could only be earned on the battlefield. 
Commercial advantage would not be easy to share either, if, as was 
often the case, it involved a trade monopoly. And territory posed similar 
problems, when it offered a strategic advantage or if sovereignty or 
religious differences were at stake. Then even trading other resources 
might not work. In negotiations to end the Great Northern War between 
Russia and Sweden, for example, the Tsar Peter the Great told his  
envoy in 1715 that he would not consider giving back Riga and Swedish 
Livonia because that would threaten nearby Petersburg and all his  
other conquests in the war and thus potentially cost him more than  
the Swedes could ever conceivably given him in return.12 Religious 
strife could make negotiation itself impossible if it meant dealing with 
enemies of the faith.13 
 These obstacles to peace were not unique to early modern Europe,  
so they cannot be the reason why Europe came to dominate the 
gunpowder technology. They were at work elsewhere too, because 
foreign policy in other parts of Eurasia was often in the hands of  
kings, emperors, or warlords who could be as obsessed with glory as 
their European counterparts.14 But the biased incentives facing the 
 
10 Brito and Intriligator, “Conflict”; Powell, “Guns” ; Fearon, “Rationalist”; and Jackson and 
Morelli, “Reasons.” 
11 Jackson and Morelli, “Political Bias.”  
12 Anisimov, Reforms, pp. 24445. 
13 Mattingly, “International Diplomacy,” p. 156. For the impact of past religious strife, see 
Fletcher and Iyigun, “Clash.” 
14 See, for example, Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 21516. 
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European princes and the indivisible spoils in their wars do at  
least explain why early modern Europe was wracked by virtually 
constant hostilities. Not that all rulers would have taken up arms.  
Some countries were too small, and, others like the Netherlands in  
the eighteenth century, were big enough to fight but tended to bow out, 
or at least not enter a particular conflict. 
 
A SIMPLE TOURNAMENT MODEL 
 
 A model inspired by the conflicts in early modern Europe can  
help explain why Europe’s kings and princes advanced the gunpowder 
technology and why rulers elsewhere in Eurasia lagged behind. We will 
sketch the model first, and then show that it fits the evidence both in 
early modern Europe and in other parts of Eurasia. 
 The requisite model has to explain decisions about going to war and 
military spending. Otherwise it cannot make sense of all the fighting in 
Europe and all the resources that went into it. It also has to account for 
improvements in military technology, so that we can isolate differences 
between Europe and Asia. 
 A simple model drawn from the economic literature on conflict  
and tournaments provides a tractable starting point.15 Although more 
complex models do a better job of accounting for the patterns of war 
and peace and of military spending that we see in the modern world, 
they have less to say about military technology, or about the virtually 
constant war that ravaged early modern Europe and parts of Asia as 
well.16 
 Consider two risk-neutral early modern rulers who are considering 
whether or not to go to war. Winning the war earns the victor a prize P, 
which might be glory or territory or a commercial advantage. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume the loser gets nothing, but the model will 
remain essentially the same if the ruler pays a penalty for losing or for 
failing to defend his kingdom against attack.17 
 
15 The model below is adapted from Fullerton and McAfee, “Auctioning,” and Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas, “Economics.” 
16 For a review of the conflict literature, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas, “Economics.” The 
insightful model of Jackson and Morelli, “Strategic Militarization,” can explain complex 
patterns of war and military spending. But it says relatively little about the effect of changes in 
the cost of war, which will be important in what follows.  
17 If losers pay a penalty d that they can avoid by sitting out the war, then the model is 
identical, but with the prize raised to P + d and the fixed cost b described below increased to  
b + d. If the penalty only applies when the ruler sits out the war and fails to defend his realm 
against attack, then the only difference is that the fixed cost decreases to b  d. 
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 To have a chance of getting the prize, the rulers have to take  
the steps that many early modern rulers did if they wanted to win  
wars. First, they have to establish an army or a navy and set up a fiscal 
system to pay the military’s bills. We can interpret that as paying  
a fixed cost b, which is assumed the same for both rulers. They  
also have to devote resources (zi  0 for ruler i ) to winning, which  
we can think of as the taxes raised to pay for supplies, weapons,  
ships, fortifications, and military personnel. Revenues from the rulers’ 
personal possessions, though usually less significant, would count too, 
and so would conscription and commandeered resources, although they 
too were typically less important, at least in early modern Europe. We 
will adopt a common functional form from the conflict literature and 
assume that the probability of ruler i winning the war if both decide  
to fight is zi /(z1 + z2 ). The odds of winning are then proportional to  
the ratio of the resources they each mobilize.18  
 Resources carry an average variable cost ci, which may be different 
for the two rulers; therefore, assume that c1  c2 . For simplicity, assume 
the average variable cost ci is constant for all levels of resources zi.19 
These costs are political: they include opposition to conscription and 
higher taxes, and resistance by elites when tax revenues they control are 
shifted to the central government. If these costs are too high or the 
expected gains from victory too low, a ruler may simply decide that it is 
not worth fighting. He can then sit on the sideline, as the Netherlands 
did in the eighteenth century. A ruler who opts out in this way expends 
no resources zi and avoids paying the fixed cost b as well, but he  
has no chance of winning the prize. Making him pay a penalty for not 
defending himself against attack will only lower the fixed cost b and 
leave the model unchanged. 
 We assume that the rulers first decide, simultaneously, whether or not 
to go to war. They then choose the resources to expend, zi . If only one 
ruler is willing to go to war, he has to pay the fixed cost b involved in 
setting up an army, navy, and fiscal system, but he is certain to win the 
prize because he faces no opposition. He therefore devotes no resources 
zi to the military and wins P – b. If both go to war, then ruler i can 
expect to earn 
 
 
18 Garfinkel and Skaperdas, “Economics.” 
19 Adding constraint on the amount of resources a ruler could mobilize would not change 
things greatly, but it would allow the ruler of a large country to offset his opponent’s lower 
average variable cost. 
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The first term in the expression is simply the probability that ruler i 
wins times the value of the prize P, and the next two terms are just the 
cost of resources zi that he mobilizes and the fixed cost b. 
 The resulting game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Only the  
ruler with the lower political costs (ruler 1) goes to war if P > b and  
P < b(1 + c2 / c1 ).2 Ruler 2 sits on the sidelines, because with his higher 
political costs, his expected winnings would not be enough to defray the 
fixed cost. Ruler 1 and obviously ruler 2 as well spend nothing on the 
military, and so there is no actual fighting. We will consider that 
outcome to be peace, even though ruler 1 has set up a military and a 
fiscal system to fund it.  
 Both rulers go to war if 
 
     P  b(1 + c2 / c1 )2        (2) 
 
Inequality 2 is necessary and sufficient for there to be war in equibrium; 
it will hold when the prize is valuable, the fixed cost is low, and the 
ratio of average variable costs c2 / c1 is near 1. The ratio is always 
greater than or equal to 1 since c2  c1 and it will be near 1 when both 
rulers face similar political costs for mobilizing resources. 
 Inequality 2 ensures that military spending will be positive, but  
it does not guarantee that it will be large, which will be essential for 
learning by doing. To see when military spending will be big, consider 
the comparative statics of the equilibrium with war. In that equilibrium, 
ruler i will spend 
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on the military, where C = c1 + c2 , while total military spending by 
both rulers will be 
 
     Z = z1 + z2 = P/C        (4) 
 
So total military spending Z will only be large if, in addition to 
inequality 2, P/C is big, or, in other words, if the prize is valuable and 
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the rulers’ political costs for mobilizing resources are low. Finally, the 
probability that ruler i wins the war will be 
 
          (1  ci /C )         (5) 
 
which will be higher for a ruler with a low average variable cost ci. 
 We will also suppose that the two rulers do not repeat this  
game. They play it once, at the outset of their reigns, and we interpret  
the decision to go to war as a choice not about a single conflict, but 
rather about being bellicose or not for their entire time on the throne.  
If they are bellicose (if inequality 2 holds), they will fight one another 
repeatedly throughout their time on the throne; if not, their reigns  
will be peaceful. Other rulers may play the game too, including their 
successors, and one might therefore worry that concern for their heirs 
would create a repeated game. Foreign policy, however, was dictated  
by short-term interests and changed enough from ruler to ruler to make 
this a reasonable assumption.20 Furthermore, although other equilibria 
would in theory exist if the game were repeated, they could vanish if  
the prize were glory or victory over an enemy of the faith. By contrast, 
playing the strategy described above at each stage would always be 
equilibrium in the repeated game; with it there would be nothing to be 
gained by making the game repeated. 
 We thus have a model with war, military spending, and peace as 
well—namely, when one ruler wins the prize without any opposition 
and no resources are actually spent on fighting. How do improvements 
to military technology fit in? The technology used will be determined 
by a ruler’s opponents. In Western Europe that was the gunpowder 
technology, but as we shall see, it was not the only military technology, 
and it was not effective against some enemies. 
 Whatever the military technology is, we will suppose that it progressed 
via learning by doing. Rulers fought wars and then used what worked 
against the enemy. That was typically how military technology advanced 
in the early modern world, whether it was weapons, organization, or 
tactics. The learning could take place during a war, or afterwards, when 
losers could copy winners and revise what they did. Conflicts in the  
late fifteenth century, for example, gave rise to lighter and more mobile 
artillery that could be mounted in and fired from gun carriages.  
 The learning extended to organization as well. French and English 
commanders who battled against Spain in the sixteenth century, for 
 
 
20 Mattingly, “International Diplomacy”; and Lynn, “International,” pp. 18586.  
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example, learned to appreciate the Spanish infantry’s training, discipline, 
and small group cohesion. They urged their own countries to adopt the 
same organization.21  
 It is true that there were also conscious attempts to improve early 
modern military technology. King Philip II of Spain, for example, 
rewarded military inventors.22 But such efforts themselves were often 
triggered by successes and failures on the battlefield, such as when the 
French sought to make lighter and more mobile field artillery after  
a defeat in the Seven Years War.23 Learning by doing dominated, until 
at least the eighteenth century, and while advances through research 
became easier after 1800, that possibility can readily be incorporated 
into an extended version of the model which would shed light on the 
nineteenth century.24 
 One reasonable way to conceive of the learning is to assume that  
it depends on the resources spent on war. Greater military spending 
gives a ruler more of a chance to learn, and rulers anywhere can do it 
—it is not peculiar to one corner of the world. We can model the 
relationship by assuming that each unit of resources z spent gives a  
ruler an independent chance at a random military innovation x, where  
x has an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function F(x)  
with support [0, a]. If we ignore the fact that z is not an integer,  
then spending z is like taking z draws from the distribution, and the ruler 
who spends z will obtain an innovation with a probability based on  
the distribution F z (x). If both rulers draw from the same distribution,  
as would be reasonable to suppose if they are fighting one another and 
using the same military technology, then the highest realized value  
of innovation in their war will come from the distribution F Z (x), where 
Z = z1 + z2 = P/C is total military spending. We will interpret this  
best innovation as an advance in military technology. As Z increases, 
the expected value of this best innovation will therefore rise, and x will 
converge in probability to a, which can be interpreted as the limit of 
available knowledge. Greater knowledge will therefore make for more 
innovation, like more military spending. Finally, if there is no war, there 
is no spending or learning, so in that case we can assume that x = 0. 
 Innovation is then an inadvertent byproduct of fighting wars, but what 
if the rulers intentionally seek to improve the military technology? If the 
 
21 La Noue, Discours, pp. 32022, 35257; Bonaparte and Favé, Etudes, vol. 1, pp. 65, 72; 
Williams, Works, c-civ; Hall, Weapons, pp. 12122; and Parrot, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 4243. 
22 Goodman, Power, pp. 12341. 
23 Alder, Engineering.  
24 For the extended model, see Hoffman, “Why Was It Europeans,” which also explains the 
armed peace achieved by diplomacy after 1815. 
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innovation proceeds via learning by doing through the process of 
spending on war, then the probability of having the best innovation will 
be exactly the same as the probability of winning the war, given by the 
first term in expression 1 above.25 Winning the tournament for the best 
innovation will be the same as winning the war, with identical incentives, 
so there will be no difference, provided innovation comes from learning 
by doing. 
 So far this tournament is not repeated, but what happens if successive 
pairs of different rulers from the same two countries play the game over 
time, say once per reign? Let us assume that each pair of rulers can copy 
the best innovation from the previous round, which seems reasonable  
if they learn from experience. It also fits what happened in early  
modern Europe, where military innovations spread through espionage, 
efforts to copy what was successful, and Europe’s longstanding market 
for weapons and military skills. Professional soldiers had every incentive 
to adopt the most effective tactics, hardware and organization. In such  
a situation, no ruler will have any technological lead over his rival  
at the start of a new round of the tournament. If the limits of available 
knowledge do not change and if the successive pairs of rulers continue to 
draw from the same distribution and fight each round, then after n rounds 
the military technology will have a distribution F Z (x), where Z is now  
the total amount expended over the n rounds of the tournament. If the 
technology is ancient, then x will be so close to a that innovation will 
slow to a halt, as typically happens with learning by doing.26 It will also 
stop if wars are not fought. But if the technology is relatively new, then  
there will still be room for continued innovation, and the tournament  
will work like an idealized prize system that puts winning ideas into the 
public domain. 
 In that case, military innovation will be sustained and will not  
slow until the limits to knowledge begin to bind. But that will not 
happen if these limits change, either through the learning by doing or 
through advances in engineering and science. Suppose, for instance,  
that learning in each round of the tournament shifts the support of the 
distribution F for the rulers in the next round to [w, w + a], where w is 
the value of the best innovation in the round that has just been played. 
Suppose too that the successive pairs of rulers confront the same  
costs and prize. They will continue fighting, and if x has expected value 
E(x) after one round, then after k rounds of fighting, its expected  
value will be k E(x). The rate of technical change in the military sector  
 
25 Fullerton and McAfee, “Auctioning.” 
26 Lucas, “Miracle.” 
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(E(x) per round, or ruler’s reign) will not slow, nor will there be any 
limit to improvements. On the other hand, if the fighting stops—say 
because the fixed costs b increase—then even under these favorable 
assumptions technical change will screech to a halt. 
 Fixed frontiers to knowledge are more realistic for the early modern 
world, at least up until the eighteenth century.27 If we assume fixed  
limits as a reasonable approximation throughout early modern Eurasia, 
then what matters for sustained improvements to military technology  
are continued war with large military expenditures, and a new military 
technology, such as the gunpowder technology, which was ripe for 
improvement via learning by doing. 
 One additional assumption here is that the winning technology 
spreads after every round of the tournament. If it does not and if  
some rulers therefore lack the latest military advances, then they will 
fall behind and stand a greater chance of losing against rulers who 
possess the cutting edge technology. Having the winning technology, 
though, does not make the playing field perfectly even. Even with it, a 
ruler with high costs ci will stand less of chance of winning against a 
low cost opponent, and if the difference in costs is big enough, he will 
simply avoid conflict. 
 Suppose now there are two technologies that are effective against 
different enemies. Gunpowder weapons, for example, worked well in 
early modern European warfare, whether on land or at sea. But until at 
least the seventeenth century, they were relatively ineffective against 
the nomads who threatened China, portions of south Asia and the 
Middle East, and even parts of Eastern Europe that bordered the 
Eurasian steppe. The mounted nomads had no cities to besiege, and they 
were too mobile to be targets for artillery, except when it was fired from 
behind the walls of fortifications. Sending the infantry chasing after 
them would demand too many provisions, since they could simply ride 
off into the steppe and live off the land. Muskets gave no advantage, 
because they could not easily be fired from horseback, and while  
pistols could, their range was limited. When fighting the nomads, the 
best option, at least for a long time, was simply to dispatch cavalry of 
mounted archers—essentially the same weapons the nomads themselves 
utilized. That was an ancient technology, which dated back to roughly 
800 BC. In the early modern world, with fixed limits to knowledge,  
it could no longer be improved, although it would still be useful in 
war.28  
 
27 Mokyr, Gifts. 
28 McNeill, Steppe; Esper, “Military”; Hellie, Enserfment; Barfield, Fronier; Rossabi, “Inner 
Asia”; Chase, Firearms; Gommans, Mughal; Agoston, Guns, pp. 5859, 191; Lorge, War; and 
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 Suppose then that a ruler fights only nomads. He will use primarily 
mounted archers, and only a little of the gunpowder technology, and 
because he spends practically nothing on it, he will not advance it. If 
one of his successors finds himself confronting an enemy against whom 
gunpowder weapons are useful, then he will try to acquire the latest 
gunpowder weapons from abroad because his realm will lag behind. 
The story will be similar for a ruler who fights on two fronts, spending a 
fraction g of his resources on the gunpowder technology and 1  g on 
mounted archers. He will improve the gunpowder technology, but at a 
lower rate because he spends only gzi on it, not zi, and his successors too 
may want to import the latest gunpowder weapons because they lag 
behind. 
 This simple tournament model is certainly open to criticism. To begin 
with, the rulers are either bellicose, or they do not fight at all, either 
because they face no opposition or because they sit on the sidelines. The 
model does not generate more complex patterns of arming and fighting, 
as a repeated game might.29 But that simple pattern does describe many 
rulers in the early modern world. Second, because the model pits only 
two rulers together at any one time, it glosses over the knotty problem 
of alliances. Yet that too is not as great a problem as it might seem.  
The underlying tournament model can be extended to more than  
two rulers, and when it is, the insights remain the same. What in fact 
matters is that there are two who are willing to fight rather than just one;  
having more than two is unimportant.30 As for alliances, sometimes they  
were determined well in advance of any hostilities and confirmed by  
a marriage. Those it would be reasonable to treat as exogenous. The 
other alliances could simply be considered another means of mobilizing 
resources, which leaves the model unchanged so long as the average 
variable cost remains constant. 
 One final problem concerns the average variable costs ci. These costs, 
which are political, cannot be observed directly. But tax rebellions, or 
elite opposition or defections when resources were mobilized for war 
would be evidence that they were high. So too would low tax levels  
in wartime. The reason is that in the equilibrium with war, the ratio  
c2 / c1 of the political costs the two rulers face will (from equation 3) 
simply equal the inverse ratio z1 / z2 of the resources they mobilize.  
 
Perdue, China. In the nineteenth century, firearms became much more effective against nomads 
(Headrick, Power, pp. 28184). 
29 See, for example, Jackson and Morelli, “Strategic Militarization.” 
30 As Fullerton and McAfee show, that someone designing such a tournament can attain  
any level of Z (and hence any expected value of innovation) at lowest cost by with only two 
contestants. 
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Tax revenues were usually the biggest component of the resources  
zi that were mobilized for war; conscription and revenues from the 
ruler’s possessions contributed much less in most cases. So if two rulers 
were fighting one another, the one with lower tax revenues would have 
a higher average variable cost ci.31 And even if rulers were not fighting 
one another, a higher average variable cost would, from equation 3, 
imply lower taxes in wartime, although the lower taxes could also result 
from a less valuable prize or from differences in an enemy’s average 
variable cost. 
 
WHERE IN EARLY MODERN EURASIA WILL THE GUNPOWDER 
TECHNOLOGY BE ADVANCED? 
 
 Despite its simplicity, the tournament model does make useful 
predictions about when there will be war and when there will be advances 
in military technology, in particular the gunpowder technology. We will 
have war if inequality 2 holds—in other words, when the value of the 
prize is higher, when opponents’ costs ci are similar, and when fixed  
costs b are smaller. Opponents’ costs will be similar if rival countries  
are of roughly the same size and face similar resistance to tax levies or 
conscription. The fixed costs will be small if setting up an army, a navy, 
or a fiscal system does not entail heavy expenses. That would certainly be 
the case if some of the fixed costs are sunk because a tax bureaucracy 
was already in place, naval dockyards had already been built, or a system 
had already been established for drafting soldiers, commandeering ships, 
or supplying provisions. The fixed costs would likely be modest too if  
the two rulers’ realms lay near one another, for fighting a distant  
country would entail setting up a big invasion force. War will persist if 
the inequality holds for successive generations of rulers. 
 Without war, there will be no learning by doing and no improvement 
in military technology. If the fighting halts, so will advances in military 
technology, and the resources mobilized zi will decline too. War will  
be likely to stop if the fixed costs rise, or if a ruler annihilates his 
opponents and conquers their realms. His successors will then have no 
nearby rivals, and their only potential adversaries will be further away 
and so entail larger fixed costs. It will simply not be worth fighting 
them. 
 Continued war, which is guaranteed by inequality 2, is, however, 
only a necessary condition for sustained productivity growth with the 
 
31 Of course if the difference between their average variable costs was too large, then the two 
would not go to war, because inequality 2 would fail to hold. 
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gunpowder technology. It is not sufficient. For that, as we know, three 
other conditions must hold as well. First, the resources Z spent on war 
must be large, for otherwise there will be little learning by doing even 
though the rulers are in the equilibrium with war. Since Z = P/C in  
the equilibrium with war, a sizeable Z requires a prize P that is large 
relative to the sum C of the average variable costs of the two rulers. 
 Second, the warring rulers must use the gunpowder technology 
heavily. If not, learning by doing with the technology will be minimal. 
Rulers who do not employ the gunpowder technology because it is 
ineffective against their enemies will not advance it, and those who 
adopt it only part of the time will improve it only modestly. 
 Third, the rulers must be able to acquire the latest innovations  
in the gunpowder technology at low cost. If not, they will lag behind 
leaders who have or can get the cutting-edge technology easily. The 
technological gap between the leaders and the laggards will widen over 
time if successive rulers spurn the gunpowder technology or warfare in 
general. If one of laggards suddenly goes to war and faces an enemy 
against whom the gunpowder technology is effective, then he will try to  
import it from the technological leaders. If he can import it quickly,  
he will catch up, and if his political costs ci are low, he will stand a 
good chance of defeating his opponent. But if there are obstacles to 
acquiring the gunpowder technology, then the gap between the leaders 
and laggards will persist, and it will grow even larger if the limits to 
knowledge shift. 
 These three additional conditions are necessary for advances with  
the gunpowder technology, and together with inequality 2 they are 
sufficient. When and where do all four of them hold? Let us start  
with the second of the additional conditions—that the rulers use the 
gunpowder technology heavily. It clearly applies to Western Europe  
and Japan, but it fails in China, for 95 percent of the time China was 
engaged in war involving nomads against whom firearms long remained 
impotent (Table 2). In confrontations with nomads, the older technology 
of mounted archers was more effective. The Western Europeans, by 
contrast, fought no wars against nomads. 
 Not that China shunned the gunpowder technology altogether. It in 
fact gained in appeal in the early seventeenth century, when an arms 
race began to develop in East Asia. As the Ming dynasty, beset by 
rebellions and under attack by the Manchus, fell into decline, its troops 
fought and defended besieged cities with muskets and artillery. Their 
opponents replied in kind. But when the Ming dynasty collapsed and 
China was unified under the Qing dynasty (16441911), the nomads  
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TABLE 2 
FREQUENCY OF FOREIGN WAR IN CHINA AND EUROPE, 15001799 
Country 
Percent of Time Country is at War Against 
Foreign Enemies, 15001799 
China  
All wars 56 
Excluding wars against nomads 3 
France 52 
England/Great Britain 53 
Spain 81 
Austrian dominions 24 
Notes: Excluding wars against nomads does not change the figures for the western European 
countries because they did not fight wars against nomads. The data for this table were collected 
by Margaret Chen, except for those for China, which were kindly furnished by James Kung. 
Chen also collected figures for China from Chinese sources, and her numbers were similar to 
Kung’s. 
Sources: Clodfelter, Warfare; Wright, Study; Stearns, Encyclopedia; and Kung (personal 
communication of the figures for China). 
 
remained the new dynasty’s major enemy well into the eighteenth 
century, and against them the gunpowder technology was still ineffective 
because it continued to strain supply lines to the breaking point.32 
 Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the various powers waging  
war in India faced similar problems with enemies who kept them  
from focusing on the gunpowder technology. Until the middle of the 
seventeenth century, the Russians’ major land enemy was nomadic 
Tatars. Firearms were of some use against them, particularly if deployed 
from behind fortified lines, but cavalry armed with bows and sabers  
was the major weapon, as in China. The Ottomans emphasized cavalry 
too, because much of their conflict involved frontier skirmishes and 
raiding. Even in the eighteenth century over 77 percent of their army 
was cavalry, versus under 27 percent in France. As for India, until the 
eighteenth century, warfare there too made heavy use of cavalry. 
 In addition, both the Ottomans and Russians had to funnel resources 
into another ancient technology with limited potential for improvement 
via learning by doing—galley warfare. Galleys, which dated back to 
classical times, were ideally suited to amphibious warfare in the light 
winds of the Mediterranean. They were also important for Russia on  
the Black Sea and the Baltic. Galleys did grow more effective in the 
Middle Ages, and in the early sixteenth century they acquired ordnance 
that made it possible to smash ship hulls. But then the limits to 
improving this aged technology were reached. Only a few guns could be 
 
32 Needham, Science, vol. 5, part 7: pp. 398407; Franke, “Siege”; Atwell, “T’ai-ch’ang”; 
Lorge War; and Perdue, China.  
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added without taxing the oarsmen; with little room to store water for  
the oarsmen, the galleys’ range was severely restricted; and they were 
vulnerable to heavily armed sailing ships.33 
 In short, the requirement that rulers rely almost exclusively on the 
gunpowder technology would work against innovation in the Ottoman 
Empire. It would lead to the same prediction for India before the 
eighteenth century, for China, except in the waning days of the Ming 
dynasty, and for Russia, at least before the late seventeenth century, 
when the Tatars ceased being a major threat. Japan and Western 
Europe, by contrast, would be more fertile ground for innovation. 
 Japan, however, eventually ran afoul of inequality 2, which predicts 
that war will stop if one ruler annihilates his opponents and conquers 
their realms. Without war, learning by doing stops, and so do advances 
in military technology. The resources mobilized zi decline too. Such an 
outcome never occurred in early modern Europe, which was always 
torn by conflict. But that is precisely what took place in Japan when it 
was unified under the Tokagawa Shogunate (16031867). 
 Japan had suffered through generations of devastating civil war  
until three victorious warlords finally unified the fragmented country 
under what became the rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns. By crushing 
opposition and rewarding loyalty, the Tokugawa then fashioned a 
regime that eliminated internal strife. Peace made the populace better 
off, but it left the Shogun with no one else to fight. In terms of our 
model, it was as though Japan’s ruler was in a tournament with no other 
contestants. He would have had no reason to devote resources to war or 
to advance the gunpowder technology, which had been heavily used in 
Japan ever since firearms were introduced in 1543. One might of course 
wonder why he or the warlords who united the country did not turn to 
foreign conquests once they had vanquished their domestic enemies. 
One of the warlords, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, actually did try to invade 
Korea (and via Korea, China) in 1592 and 1597, but failed, because  
he “lacked the resources” needed to carry out such an operation—in 
particular, a large navy. Other Japanese leaders were “unenthusiastic” 
about the operation and “quickly” withdrew from Korea after Hideyoshi 
died. They seemed to realize that an invasion without adequate 
resources was unrealistic. They knew, in other words, that successful 
military competition against foreign powers entailed a large fixed cost 
 
33 For this and the preceding paragraph, see Agoston, Guns, pp. 191, 20203; Esper, 
“Military”; Glete, Navies, pp. 11415, 13946, 310, 70612; Gommans, Mughal; Gommans and 
Kolff, Warfare; Guilmartin, “Ideology” and Galleons, pp. 10625; Hellie, Enserfment; Lynn, 
Giant, pp. 52829; McNeill, Steppe; Parry and Yapp, War; Paul, “Military Revolution”; and 
Pryor, Geography. 
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(relative to the size of the prize), including the expense of building a 
powerful navy. That fixed cost—the b in the tournament model—ruled 
out the possibility of foreign war and thus halted improvements to the 
gunpowder technology.34 
 As in Tokugawa Japan, inequality 2 would have also discouraged 
China from fighting distant wars in which the gunpowder technology 
might have been more useful than it was against nomads. For much of 
its history, China was a large unified empire and much bigger than 
neighboring states. The emperors (and the officials who advised them) 
would therefore have found themselves in a situation akin to that of the 
Tokugawa Shoguns: warfare abroad (including invading Japan) would 
have required building an effective navy or fighting distant land battles. 
That would have meant paying a prohibitively high fixed cost b, which 
would have made such wars unattractive. 
 What about the two other conditions for improving the gunpowder 
technology: that the ratio P/C of the value of prize to the sum of  
the average variable costs be high, and that rulers be able to acquire  
the latest innovations at low cost? The requirement that P/C be high  
clearly handicapped the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.  
The Ottomans were fighting European states so they were contending for 
the same prize P, but their tax revenues were lower than in eighteenth-
century Europe. They collected less than the median for major European 
powers, less than what one of their major opponents, the Austrians raised, 
and less than what their other chief enemy, the Russians, mobilized,  
at least after 1750.35 It follows that the Ottomans had a higher average 
variable cost of mobilizing resources than in Europe and that they were 
unlikely to be the ones advancing the gunpowder technology. Their high 
cost of mobilizing resources would also imply (from expression 5) that 
they had little chance of defeating European rulers in the eighteenth 
century even if they imported the latest weapons and tactics. 
 As for the European rulers, their average variable costs of mobilizing 
resources were not only lower than in the Ottoman Empire (at least after 
1700), but likely lower than in China too. The evidence comes from 
capita tax rates in wartime, which were much higher in Europe than in 
China (Table 3). Although the difference could simply reflect a less 
valuable prize in China or the nature of China’s enemies, it is bolstered  
 
 
34 Smith, “Land Tax”; Reischauer, Fairbank, and Craig, History, vol. 1: pp. 61415; Berry, 
Hideyoshi, pp. 20717, “Presidential Address,” and “Public Peace,” pp. 20717; Brown, 
Central Authority; Parker, Military Revolution, pp. 14043; Guilmartin, Galleons, pp. 18290; 
and Chase, Firearms, pp. 17596. 
35 Pamuk and Karaman, “Ottoman.” 
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TABLE 3 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA TAXATION IN CHINA, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE, 1578 AND 1776 
(in grams of silver) 
    1578   1776 
China Total 6.09 8.08 
China Portion under central government control  3.56 7.03 
England Portion under central government control 10.47 180.06 
France Portion under central government control 16.65 61.11 
Note: The figures for England and France are decennial averages. For China, they are upper 
bound estimates that involve the following assumptions: the population is 175 million in 1578 
and 259 million in 1776; the grain levy in 1578 is converted to silver at 1 shi equals 0.6 taels of 
silver; the service levy in 1578 is worth 10 million taels per year; the portion of taxes under 
central government control in 1578 includes taxes sent to Beijing or Nanjing, plus 25 percent of 
the service levy; 87 percent of the taxes are under central government control in 1776. China 
was at war in 1578 and 1776, which might have raised tax levels. For the sake of comparison, 
England was at war throughout the 1570s and seven years out of ten in the 1770s; France fought 
three years of ten in the 1570s and five years of out ten in the 1770s. 
Source: For France, see Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, pp. 23839; for England,  
see the European State Finance Data Base that Richard Bonney has assembled 
(http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/dir.html ), data Mark Dincecco has posted at the Global 
Price and Income Group website ( http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/ ) and explained in Dincecco, “Fiscal 
Centralization,” and population figures from Wrigley and Schofield, Population History,  
table A3.1; for China, see Huang, “Ming Fiscal”; Myers and Wang, “Economic Developments”; 
Liu, “Nexus of Power”; and the Global Price and Income History Group website for units, silver 
equivalents, and prices of grain in China. 
 
by claims that tax revenue in China were in fact constrained by the 
threat of revolt and by elites who could more easily siphon off tax 
revenue in larger empire.36 Another sign that the average variable cost 
was low in Europe is that taxes were high relative to GDP, at least in the 
eighteenth century, when we can make such comparisons for France 
and England. By then, France was spending 5 to 10 percent of its GDP 
on military resources, and Great Britain even more—perhaps as much 
as 28 percent. 37 For countries that were still poor by modern standards, 
these figures are quite high. For comparison, at the end of the Cold War, 
the United States was devoting 5 percent of its GDP to the military, and 
the USSR perhaps 10 percent. 38 
 Like Europe, Japan before the Tokugawa Shogunate might have  
also faced low average variable costs. The evidence is indirect. The 
armies Japanese warlords raised were big relative to the population, but  
that would be what one would expect in wartime when P/C was large.39 
 
36 Huang, “Military Expenditures” and “Ming Fiscal”; Sng, “Size”; and Brandt, Ma, 
and Rawski, “From Divergence.” 
37 Kennedy, Rise, table 2; and Mathias and O’Brien, “Taxation,” table 5. French military 
expenditures are assumed to range from 45 to 85 percent of tax revenues. 
38 Brzoska, “Military Expenditures,” table 3. 
39 Finer, History, vol. 3, p. 1088. 
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By the eighteenth century, the Russians too likely had a low average 
variable cost too and a high value for P/C. They were by then fighting 
the Western Europeans for the same prize, and although their per capita 
tax revenues were still lower than in the west, the czars—thanks to  
the reforms of Peter the Great (16821725)—could draft serfs into the 
military, cutting the average variable costs of fielding a military force.40 
By contrast, western leaders had to wait for the wars of the French 
Revolution to conscript troops on that scale. 
 Finally, India’s leaders were hobbled by high average costs of 
mobilizing resources and by a lower value of the prize they were fighting 
for, all of which reduced their P/C ratio. The Indian case is in fact a 
telling one. In the eighteenth century, the subcontinent was convulsed by 
virtually constant warfare among the leaders and states that arose as the 
Mughal Empire disintegrated. The unremitting hostilities imply that 
inequality 2 was satisfied, and the armies were fighting with gunpowder 
weapons and could easily have acquired leading innovations from one 
another in what was an active market for military goods and services.41 
But the one remaining condition required for advancing the gunpowder 
technology—that P/C be high—failed to hold. 
 On the one hand, political costs C of mobilizing resources were high. 
Data on tax revenues for India are lacking, but it is clear that the new 
states that emerged on the subcontinent were struggling to gain control 
of resources that remained in local hands.42 In addition, the value of the 
prize P was reduced by conflict within powerful Indian families over 
succession to a throne or rights to rule.43 Strife of this sort, which after 
the late Middle Ages was rarer in Europe, cut the value of the prize for 
victors in India, by raising the odds that a prince or other ruler would be 
unable to enjoy the fruits of winning. The prize was still valuable 
enough to get the rulers to fight, but not big enough relative to the 
average variable costs of fighting to get them to mobilize a large 
amount of resources Z. Since they were not raising many resources, the 
model would predict that their wars would generate little or no 
innovation. 
 The Indian case shows why unending warfare and highly developed 
markets for military goods were not enough to obtain advances in the 
use of gunpowder. If they had been enough, then eighteenth-century 
 
40 Hellie, Enserfment; and Pintner, “Burden.”  
41 Kolff, Naukar; Gommans and Kolff, Warfare; and Gommans, Mughal. Although the 
Mughal Empire did use gunpowder weapons, it was more reliant on cavalry than the Europeans. 
42 Barua, “Military Developments”; Stein, “State Formation”; Washbrook, “Progress”; and 
Alam and Subrahmanyam, “L’état moghol.” 
43 Gommans, Mughal.  
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India should in fact have been an innovator, not a laggard. Our model, 
by contrast, predicts the opposite, because with high political costs  
and strife over rights to rule, the Indian rulers would in equilibrium  
utilize small amounts of military resources and thus fail to innovate. 
The model can also help explain why the East India Company became a 
dominant military power in India. It simply had lower average variable 
costs of using the military and thus was willing to mobilize more 
military resources in equilibrium. Not only could it draw on its own 
financial system to fund its military ventures, but it had also gotten 
control of the wealthy Ganges plain in northwestern India and won 
support for higher taxes there by offering elites a land market in return 
for higher levies. Elite cooperation and more wealth to tax would mean 
a lower average cost ci and, from expression 5, a greater chance of 
winning wars. It would be no surprise then that the company conquered 
much of the subcontinent, simply by hiring away the best officers and 
their troops.44 
 The only remaining condition is that rulers be able to acquire 
innovations at low cost. The barriers to doing so are clear. In the early 
modern world, embargos would not have been the major obstacle, since 
enforcement was difficult. But distance alone hampered the diffusion of 
the latest skills, weapons, and tactical innovations, even if mercenaries 
and weapons makers were willing to work for foreign masters. 
Technological gaps could then have increased if learning by doing 
persisted in one part of Eurasia and stopped in another. All rulers 
potentially could have advanced the gunpowder technology, but if some 
fell behind, catching up would have been difficult. 
 Some parts of the technology, after all, were just hard to transfer, 
which would have widened the gaps between laggards and leaders.  
The reason was that they involved a number of complementary skills  
or reforms, and rulers had to acquire the whole package if they wanted 
the innovation. One of the improvements to French artillery in the 
eighteenth century, for instance, was a shift to manufacturing them  
by boring a solid casting instead of using a mould with a hollow core. 
Boring made cannons more accurate and cut the number rejected in 
initial testing. But adopting the technique required careful training  
and supervision of whole teams of skilled workers. The Swiss cannon 
founder who perfected the process complained that if business declined 
and some of his employees departed, he would have a hard time finding 
and training replacements when demand picked up again. And so, when 
 
44 Alavi, Sepoys; Gommans and Kolff, Warfare; Cooper, Campaigns; Gommans, Mughal; 
and T. Roy, “British India.”  
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he was asked to export the process to France’s ally, Spain, he contracted 
to import a whole group of skilled workers and even obtained the right 
to impose heavy penalties on any of them who quit.45 Hiring the cannon 
founder alone was thus insufficient. The king of Spain needed all the 
supporting skills, or else he had to wait until a skilled team could  
be assembled and whipped into shape. Transferring the innovations 
would have been even slower if they depended on complementary 
skills, such as navigation or metalworking, that were scarce in the 
civilian economy.  
 Gunpowder innovations would spread most easily, we would therefore 
expect, when enemy powers were small and near one another and  
when military goods, services, and ideas could move between them with 
relative freedom. That was the case in India, and perhaps in Japan before 
the Tokugawa Shogunate as well, since the battling Japanese warlords 
were close enough to one another to at least copy what worked. And it 
was certainly the case in Western Europe. 
 Western Europe is also the only part of Eurasia that satisfies all  
the other conditions required for advancing the gunpowder technology, 
and it does so throughout the entire early modern period. No  
other Eurasian powers can meet that standard. The model would therefore 
predict that Western Europe would be a leader in advancing the 
gunpowder technology. The other Eurasian powers would have lagged 
behind. Could they have caught up by importing European innovations 
when needed? They would all have had an incentive to buy the latest 
military technology from Western Europe if it was more effective 
militarily, and the Europeans did in fact export their arms and expertise to 
places as far away as China.46 But wholesale transfer of the cutting-edge 
technology would have been hampered by distance alone in South or East 
Asia. If it was difficult to move a whole team of cannon makers from 
France to Spain, how much harder would it have been to get them to 
India or China? The obstacles would have been much higher, because of 
the risks of ocean travel and the difficulties of getting Europeans to settle 
in an alien place. 
 Russia and the Ottoman Empire would have a somewhat easier time of 
it, since they were closer to Western Europe. Yet even with the imports, 
we would predict that anemic tax revenues would keep the Ottomans 
from defeating the Europeans after 1700. The Russians, by contrast, 
could be expected to do much better, at least after the late seventeenth 
century. Not only could they import the technology more easily than 
 
45 Alder, Engineering, pp. 3946; and Minost, “Maritz.”  
46 Hoffman, “Prices.” 
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distant Asian powers, but they could now focus on fighting with 
gunpowder weapons and mobilize enormous resources by drafting serfs.  
 
TESTING THE MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS IN EARLY MODERN 
EURASIA 
 
 We can test the model’s implications for early modern Eurasia.  
If we begin with Western Europe, we would expect to see innovation 
and productivity growth in the military sector. That certainly fits  
the literature on the military revolution, but there is also quantitative 
evidence supporting this prediction too, for we can measure the rate at 
which the productivity of the technology was increasing. The yardsticks 
used underestimate the productivity growth, because they fail to capture 
advances in tactics or provisioning that were an integral part of the 
gunpowder technology. They also have trouble with naval warfare, 
where Western Europe’s lead was perhaps greatest. The reason is  
that warships had a variety of different goals, which varied over time. 
Firepower dominated the eighteenth century, but speed, range, and an 
ability to fight in inclement weather were also important, particularly  
in wars of economic attrition that were the focus of much early modern 
naval warfare.47  
 Yet despite all these difficulties, the evidence that military productivity 
was advancing in early modern Europe is clear. Suppose, for example, 
that we ignore the other goals navies pursued and take firepower, 
measure by the weight of the shot, as our sole yardstick of naval output, 
which we can divide by shipboard labor and capital to get an index of 
total factor productivity. In the English navy, this index was rising at a 
rate of 0.4 percent per year between 1588 and 1680, a period when 
firepower was gaining in importance.48 Such a rapid growth was virtually 
unheard of in preindustrial economies, where total productivity was 
typically increasing at 0.1 percent per year or less in major sectors of the 
economy, if it grew at all.49 
 
47 Guilmartin, Gunpowder, pp. 253254 and “Guns”; and Glete, Navies, pp. 5861. 
48 Capital is computed from displacement, and labor from crew sizes for the English navy, 
using Martin and Parker, Armada; and Glete, Navies, pp. 186, 195, 205. Factor shares (0.496 for 
capital and 0.503 for labor) come from 1744 construction and crew labor costs in Boudriot and 
Berti, Les vaisseaux, pp. 14652. For firepower, see Glete, Navies; Guilmartin, Galleons; and 
Martin and Parker, Armada, pp. 3336. 
49 For examples, see Hoffman, Growth; and Clark, Farewell. One might argue that the 
English navy was simply specializing in firepower at the expense of speed or range—in  
other words, that it was moving along a frontier of output possibilities while productivity 
remained constant. But by the late 1500s it had already begun to emphasize bombardment as an 
alternative to the boarding that had been the customary goal in naval battles, and the 1588 data 
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 Nor was productivity growth limited to naval warfare. On land, the 
effective firing rate per French infantryman jumped by a factor of 6 or 
more between 1600 and 1750, as bayonets made it possible to replace 
pike men and matchlocks were supplanted by flintlocks with ramrods and 
paper cartridges. The higher firing rate translated into labor productivity 
growth of 1.5 percent per year, which rivals overall labor productivity 
growth rates in modern economies and far exceeds what one would 
expect for preindustrial economies.50 
 Still another sign of rapid productivity growth was the falling price of 
weapons. The prices of cannons, muskets, and pistols tumbled relative to 
the price of other manufactured goods and relative to the cost of the 
relevant factors of production. Using the cost function dual, we can 
estimate productivity for weapons manufacturing in early modern France 
and England. The median total factor productivity growth rate over 
periods ranging from the late fourteenth century to the late eighteenth 
century turns out to have been 0.6 percent per year, a rapid pace even at 
the outset of the Industrial Revolution.51 
 What about the model’s implications for the rest of early modern 
Eurasia? Although we lack similar figures for productivity, we can test 
the predictions against the historical record. If we begin with Japan, the 
model predicts improvements to the gunpowder technology until the 
Tokugawa Shogunate gained power in the early seventeenth century, 
when warfare and innovation should have stopped and tax collections 
should have tapered off.  
 Those predictions match the historical record. Before the Tokugawa, 
the Japanese had discovered—some twenty years earlier than 
Europeans—the key tactical innovation of volley fire that allowed 
infantry soldiers with slow-loading muskets to maintain a nearly 
continuous round of fire. With the Tokugawa, war stopped and so did that 
sort of innovation.52 And over time, tax revenues declined as fraction of 
agricultural output.53 A cultural explanation cannot account for this 
sudden change, for Japanese continued to have a strong attachment to 
martial values. One might fear that this line of argument simply repeats 
the story of how the Tokugawa Shoguns banished guns. But in fact, the 
 
in fact come from ships that were already specialized in firepower—the heavily armed flotilla 
that defeated the Spanish Armada. 
50 Hoffman, “Prices,” Table 3. 
51 Ibid. An alternative calculation yields an even higher median rate of 1.1 percent per year. 
52 Parker, Military Revolution, pp. 1819, 140143; Chase, Firearms, pp. 175196; and Berry 
“Presidential Address.” 
53 Smith, “Land Tax.” 
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shoguns did not ban firearms. Although they disarmed the population, 
they kept their own guns and required them for lords too.54 
 Historical evidence also confirms the model’s implications for China 
and eighteenth-century India. Both would have been expected to lag 
behind Western Europe in developing the gunpowder technology, even 
though China was the birthplace of firearms and India would have been 
fertile ground for advances in gunpowder technology if the argument 
about competition were correct. Both should also have tried to import 
weapons and expertise from Europe when the gunpowder technology 
proved useful. 
 That is exactly what happened. In China, officials recognized that 
European weapons were superior, and they sought designs and expertise 
from the Portuguese or the Jesuits in both the Ming and the Qing 
dynasties.55 Military leaders in eighteenth-century India followed much 
the same path. They readily adopted new weapons and tactics in their 
unending wars, but they did not break new ground in their use. The 
innovations, by and large, came from Western Europe with renegade 
experts, mercenary officers, and imports of weapons.56 
 The model implies that Russia and the Ottoman Empire would  
also have been less likely to advance the gunpowder technology and 
that both would have imported weapons and military expertise from 
Western Europe, up until the eighteenth century. Then their paths would 
have diverged. High political costs ci would have made the Ottomans 
drop further back and cut their odds of winning wars, particularly 
against western powers. The reverse would have happened for the 
Russians. 
 In fact, military historians argue that the Ottomans fell behind 
Western Europe in the late seventeenth century, particularly in field 
warfare. Although the Ottomans had a large artillery industry, they 
imported expertise from Western Europe. By the eighteenth century, 
they dropped from the ranks of the great powers in Europe and were 
 
54 For the source of the story (Noel Perrin’s Giving up the Gun) and a review that sets the 
facts straight, see Totman, “Review.” 
55 Josson and Willaert, Correspondance de Verbiest; Needham, Science, vol. 5, part 6; 
Spence, To Change China, pp. 15, 29; Franke, “Siege”; Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell,  
pp. 11115; Waley-Cohen, “China”; Lorge, War, pp. 12528; and Li, “Late Ming Military 
Reform.” 
56 Kolff, Naukar; Gommans and Kolff, Warfare; Gommans, Mughal; and K. Roy, “Hybrid 
Military Establishment.” Even defenders of Indian military prowess admit that the advances 
with the gun powder technology by and large came from the West. See Subrahmanyam, 
“Kagemusha”; Barua, “Military Developments”; Alavi, Sepoys, pp. 2425; Cooper, Campaigns, 
pp. 3132, 4244, 28994; and Parthasarathi, Why Europe, pp. 20613. 
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more likely to lose wars.57 Russia, by contrast, joined the great powers 
in the eighteenth century, after importing western officers, shipwrights, 
cannon founders, and military architects. It increasingly began to win 
wars against Western European powers.58  
 The divergence between Russia and the Ottoman Empire is difficult to 
square with the argument that wars alone led to gunpowder innovations 
because both were frequently engaged in conflicts. That argument also 
fails to explain why all the wars in war-torn eighteenth-century India 
failed to advance the gunpowder technology. The tournament model  
can. It can also account for why China lagged behind, even though it was 
the birthplace of the gunpowder technology, and why Japan suddenly 
stopped improving the gunpowder technology, a shift that cannot be 
reconciled with a cultural argument. And the model also fits Eurasian 
evidence about military victories, trends in taxation, and the flow of 
military goods and services. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The tournament model of Europe’s wars yields a deeper understanding 
of why Europeans pushed the gunpowder technology of firearms, 
fortifications, and armed ships further than anyone else. Exogenous 
political and military conditions drove the rulers of Western Europe’s 
major powers to raise taxes and to spend heavily on this technology in 
fighting unending wars. The result was sustained innovation via learning 
by doing, all before the Industrial Revolution. 
 Elsewhere, political and military conditions blocked such an outcome. 
In Japan, unification under the Tokugawa Shogunate snuffed out a 
similar tournament and removed incentives to funnel resources into the 
gunpowder technology. The story was similar in China, for it too, most  
of the time, was a large, unified empire. Furthermore, the gunpowder 
technology was not effective against its major enemy, nomads from the 
north. The technology was of little use either in Russia’s early wars, or 
against some of the Ottoman Empire’s adversaries. In addition, by the 
eighteenth century, the Ottoman emperors faced heavy political obstacles 
 
57 Levy, War; Murphey, “Ottoman Attitude”; and Agoston, Guns, pp. 1012, 19394, 201. 
The Ottomans lost 30 percent of 23 wars in the years 15001699 and 56 percent of nine wars in 
17001799 (p = 0.09, one-sided). 
58 Cipolla, Guns; Hellie, Enserfement; Levy, War; Pintner, “Burden”; Anisimov, Reforms; 
Paul, “Military Revolution”; and Kotilaine, “Defense.” Russia did develop an arms industry 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but arms imports continued up to the 1780s. 
Russia lost 36 percent of 11 wars in 15001699 and 12 percent of 17 wars in 17001799  
(p = 0.06, one-sided). 
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to raising taxes. So did the leaders whose forces battled in unending wars 
in eighteenth-century India. 
 The implication, according to the model, is that all of these parts of 
Eurasia would fall behind Western Europe in developing the gunpowder 
technology, and that the gap would grow over time, particularly in 
countries far from the leaders in Western Europe, because distance 
would slow the transfer of innovations, particularly if packages of 
complementary skills were involved. Both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence bears out this and the other predictions the model makes and 
argues against alternative explanations for Europe’s dominance of the 
gunpowder technology. The argument about competition, for example, 
cannot explain why all the wars in eighteenth-century India failed to 
make it a center of military innovation. 
 Europe’s lead was not foreordained. Learning by doing would  
have been possible anywhere before the Industrial Revolution, provided 
that the exogenous political and military conditions were right. If the 
Mongols, for example, had not conquered China, then it might have 
remained divided, and the successors to the southern Song emperors 
might have had more of an incentive to funnel resources into the 
gunpowder technology. China, the birthplace of gunpowder, might not 
have fallen behind. 
 But Europeans ended up dominating this technology, which allowed 
them to wage war at a distance. They were not posting huge infantry 
armies abroad, at least before the nineteenth century. But they could 
dispatch ships armed with cannons to prey upon trade in places as  
far away as Southeast Asia, and for protection, ship maintenance, and 
essential supplies of water and fresh food, the ships could rely upon 
European-style fortresses, which, when built in Asia or the Americas, 
could be defended with a relatively small force. The fortresses thus 
complemented the naval forces and allowed the Europeans to hold 
critical trading posts and to protect what land they conquered without 
sending large numbers of officers and men abroad, an expensive 
undertaking given the high mortality rates during long voyages. And 
further technological innovation in the nineteenth century (which a 
variant of the model can explain) made it possible to extend the 
conquests and create colonial empires.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Headrick, Tools and Power. 
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